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SMOKING LAWS AND THEIR DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS ON
 
RESTAURANTS, BARS, AND TAVERNS
 
JOHN DUNHAM and MICHAEL L. MARLOW* 
This article examines the effect of restrictive smoking laws on restaurants, bars, and 
taverns. Supporters of these laws often argue that they do not harm ﬁrms and may 
even raise proﬁts. Opponents argue that owners cater to customer smoking preferences, 
and laws mandating speciﬁc policies will negatively impact proﬁts. This article provides 
a framework for examining the distribution of effects that smoking laws exert on busi­
nesses, and demonstrates that changes in total sales or tax revenues do not provide a 
meaningful understanding of the economic implications because smoking laws exert dif­
ferent effects on different ﬁrms. The distribution of these effects is examined using data 
from a nationwide survey of 1,300 restaurant, bar, and tavern owners. While some sub­
sets of ﬁrms are predicted to suffer revenue declines, bars are predicted to be more than 
twice as likely to experience losses as restaurants. An important implication is that the 
increasing level of governmental restrictions on smoking in the hospitality sector could 
gradually impact the types of service available to the public. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws restricting smoking in restaurants 
have been enacted in 32 states.1 Support­
ers argue that these laws do not harm ﬁrms 
and may even raise their proﬁts. Recent 
studies ﬁnd that bans on smoking in eating 
and drinking places have not impacted the 
proﬁtability of these establishments, sug­
gesting that smoking bans either do not 
reduce demand or offset sales losses by 
lowering costs. Opponents of smoking restric­
tions argue that some owners would ﬁnd 
it proﬁtable to allow smoking throughout 
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1. Smoking laws have been imposed on restau­
rants in Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. 
their establishments, others to forbid all 
smoking, and still others to accommodate 
both smokers and nonsmokers by creating 
separate areas or investing in partitions, 
smoking patios or rooms, and air ﬁltration 
systems. 
Little economic research has been pub­
lished on the effects of smoking laws on the 
proﬁtability of restaurants, bars, and taverns, 
and almost none has been directed toward 
the issue of how these laws may exert dif­
ferential effects on businesses. This article 
provides a framework for examining how 
smoking laws impact establishments based on 
a number of business attributes. Hypothe­
ses regarding the effect of smoking laws are 
tested using data from a nationwide survey of 
1,300 restaurant and bar owners. The empiri­
cal evidence indicates that smoking laws exert
differential effects on businesses.
II. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON 
SMOKING LAWS 
A.	 Studies Conclude That Smoking Laws 
Do Not Harm Firms 
While a full examination of the welfare 
effects of smoking laws must consider all 
members of society, our literature review 
focuses on the economic effects of smoking 
  
laws on the owners of ﬁrms.2 Three published 
studies have concluded that businesses do not 
suffer reduced sales as a result of bans. Glantz 
and Smith (1994) compare 15 cities with 
smoking laws with 15 matched control group 
cities. They conclude that “legislators and 
government ofﬁcials can enact such health 
and safety requirements to protect patrons 
and employees in restaurants from the tox­
ins in second-hand tobacco smoke without 
the fear of adverse economic consequences” 
(p. 1085). In their study of smoking laws in 
North Carolina, Goldstein and Sobel (1998) 
conclude: “Even in the number one tobacco-
producing state in the U.S., ETS regulations 
present no adverse economic impact, and 
there is no need for exceptions to the ordi­
nances based on such fears” (p. 286). Sciacca 
and Ratliff (1998) conclude in their study of 
Arizona ﬁrms that “[t]his study seems to indi­
cate that prohibiting smoking in all Flagstaff 
restaurants has had no effect on total restau­
rant sales     If these ﬁndings are true for 
communities throughout the United States, 
then other cities can enact similar laws, which 
protect patrons and food service workers from 
tobacco smoke, without concerns that restau­
rants will lose business” (p. 184). 
B. Previous Studies Cannot Uncover 
Differential Effects 
These three studies all rely on a methodol­
ogy that examines sales tax revenues in cities 
that have enacted smoking bans by comparing 
them with control cities that have not adopted 
such laws. There are serious methodological 
problems with this approach.3 One problem 
is that gross retail sales or tax revenues are 
not useful measures by which to gauge eco­
nomic effects on a diverse set of ﬁrms. For 
example, on an aggregate basis, ﬁrms subject 
to a ban may show no net effect on sales even 
though one-half of ﬁrms showed gains and the 
other half exhibited losses. It is not particu­
larly useful to conclude that nothing occurred. 
Evidence of differential effects was uncov­
ered by a Peat Marwick (1996) study of the 
1995 smoking ban in California restaurants. 
2. The impact of smoking laws on consumer and 
producer surplus could also be examined; see Becker 
and Murphy (1993) and Tremblay and Tremblay (1995). 
3. Evan’s (1997) review of Glantz and Smith (1997) 
points out numerous statistical ﬂaws and concludes that 
ﬁndings of no effects are unwarranted. 
Their random survey of 600 owners concluded 
that, while 52% lost business, 6% gained busi­
ness, and the rest did not know. Of the 37 
owners with favorable effects, 32% had out­
door seating, and 57% had bar seating—areas 
exempted at that time. 
The studies that ﬁnd no adverse effects are 
unable to detect differential effects because 
they aggregate all ﬁrms in a community 
together. This approach conveys confusion 
about effects exerted on individual ﬁrms. But 
an understanding of differential effects is 
essential for a comprehensive social welfare 
analysis and would be necessary in determin­
ing appropriate levels of compensation for 
injured parties within the broader framework 
of social welfare analysis. 
C. Problems	 with Control Group 
Methodology 
Comparisons between cities with smok­
ing laws and those without reveal effects 
from the laws only when studies properly 
control for nonban factors that affect sales. 
Previous studies match cities on the basis 
of population density and size and median 
income. However, it is unclear whether these 
factors control for differences in tourism, 
weather, tax rates, and employment growth, 
all of which could also inﬂuence businesses.4 
Moreover, studies compare ratios of restau­
rant/bar sales to total sales to examine eco­
nomic effects of laws on ﬁrms. Glantz and 
Smith (1994), for example, state that, “If an 
ordinance adversely affected restaurants, this 
fraction would be expected to drop when the 
ordinance was in force” (p. 1088). However, 
when nonban factors are not controlled for, 
this ratio cannot reveal independent effects 
of laws on ﬁrms. 
D. Samples Are Not Random 
Previous studies have not used random 
samples. For example, Glantz and Smith 
(1984) chose “the ﬁrst 15 US cities to enact 
smoke-free ordinances affecting restaurants” 
(p. 1087). This sampling poses a problem 
because these locations have relatively few 
smokers since otherwise they would probably 
4. Glantz and Smith (1994) selected control cities 
that did not mandate smoking bans; however, Evans 
(1997) found that more than half were misclassiﬁed. 
  
not be ﬁrst to legislate bans. A sample selec­
tivity bias arises because such locations would 
tend to experience relatively little harm from 
bans.5 Moreover, local legislators are likely to 
be optimistic about local economic conditions 
since they are unlikely to promote laws that 
jeopardize tax revenues. The authors then 
appear to have handpicked locations where 
economic downturns in the restaurant and bar 
sectors are unlikely following passage of bans. 
Empirical results are then subject to two 
selection biases. First, authors have “cherry­
picked” samples that will exhibit relatively 
few adverse effects from laws. Second, sam­
pling calls into question conclusions that 
adoption of similar laws to other locations 
will yield similar effects. Cities with laws and 
those without (control groups) are dissimilar 
when it comes to smoking issues, and it is 
unlikely that adoption of bans to other cities 
would go as smoothly as in cities that were 
ﬁrst to adopt them. 
E. Smoking Bans Are Not Uniformly 
Enforced 
Smoking bans are not always fully 
enforced. In California, for example, 
widespread civil disobedience appears com­
mon (Blankstein, 1998; Canto, 1998). This 
indicates that some percentage of ﬁrms would 
be adversely affected by full compliance— 
thus validating claims that smoking bans 
adversely affect some ﬁrms. Noncomplying 
ﬁrms would also tend to suffer greater effects 
from fuller compliance. Differences in com­
pliance rates compound the problem of mak­
ing predictions about how other locations 
might be impacted. 
F. Studies Focus on Revenues, Not Proﬁt 
Owners may attempt to overcome lost 
business by raising prices or lowering product 
quality. Owners may also increase advertising 
or provide promotions that add to costs. If so, 
proﬁts will change. Previous studies examine 
only revenues, which do not indicate proﬁts. 
5. Dunham and Marlow (2000) argue that, while 
restaurants that operate in states that have enacted 
smoking restrictions also tend to offer a larger share 
of their seating to nonsmoking use, this has little to do 
with presence of a smoking law. Rather, their customers 
simply have stronger preferences for such seating. 
G. Summary 
Previous studies offer little information 
about the economic effects of bans on restau­
rants and bars. Sample selection bias and a 
statistical methodology based on community 
averages and control group comparisons do 
not clearly isolate economic effects. No infor­
mation on how such effects differ between 
establishments is reported. Many nonban fac­
tors that affect revenues are not properly 
controlled for, leading to serious questions 
about whether studies tell us much about 
the effects of smoking laws on ﬁrms. Imper­
fect enforcement and sample selection prob­
lems suggest problems with predictions of 
how laws would affect other cities. Finally, 
studies focus on revenues, whereas proﬁts are 
the more useful indicator of economic effects 
on ﬁrms. 
It is also important to realize that ﬁnd­
ings of no negative effects on revenues in the 
aggregate could be consistent with a state in 
which ﬁrms have not reached an optimal mix 
of smoking and nonsmoking seating. How­
ever, this situation does not necessarily mean 
that banning smoking is efﬁcient because 
changes in community attitudes would most 
likely lead to seating changes by ﬁrms that 
are more optimal than from government reg­
ulation. No adverse revenue effects does not 
necessarily mean that future revenues would 
not be lower than they would otherwise have 
been as ﬁrms adapt to changes in smoking 
preferences. However, lack of adverse effects 
may simply be a result of serious statistical 
ﬂaws in previous studies. 
III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SMOKING LAWS 
Coase (1960) provides a general frame­
work for how ﬁrms efﬁciently deal with the 
smoking issue in the hospitality industry, and 
demonstrates that private markets internal­
ize externalities when there are trivial trans­
action costs and property rights are clearly 
assigned.6 Although this study does not focus 
on the externality issue per se, applica­
tion of the Coase theorem has important 
implications about how owners allocate air 
space within establishments and therefore 
how smoking laws will affect proﬁts.7 
6. See Boyes and Marlow (1996) for a more detailed 
discussion. 
7. Ban proponents argue that taxpayers subsidize 
higher health care costs of smokers. However, Lee 
Although the air space is commonly 
viewed as a public domain resource, this is 
untrue within the conﬁnes of private ﬁrms. 
Whether an owner caters solely to smok­
ers or to nonsmokers, or accommodates 
both, depends on customer preferences and 
marginal costs of accommodation.8 
Transaction costs are not prohibitive 
because owners act as intermediaries between 
smoking and nonsmoking customers. Negoti­
ation occurs via owners who determine what 
air space allocation is consistent with max­
imum proﬁts, and in this way, private mar­
kets tend toward internalization of externali­
ties. Incorrect decisions displease patrons and 
lower proﬁts. 
Smoking regulations shift ownership of the 
air space from restaurant and bar propri­
etors to individuals who prefer that restric­
tions take place. Options facing customers 
may change, and smoking customers may 
choose to spend more time at home rather 
than going out, while nonsmokers may spend 
more time at ﬁrms when they believe that 
laws improved environments.9 
Supply-side effects arise when laws change 
cost by requiring that ﬁrms expend more 
resources accommodating nonsmokers. In 
the hospitality industry, proﬁts are deter­
mined in a relatively free market, with a large 
number of suppliers and customers.10 Own­
ers determine levels of different attributes, 
including price, quality, quantity, cuisine, and 
smoking accommodation to maximize prof­
its. It is an empirical question as to how 
proﬁts will change following smoking laws. 
A testable hypothesis is then that restrictions 
exert differential effects on proﬁts. Effects 
should also vary between restaurant and bar 
industries, simply because of differences in 
(1991) suggests that bans do not correct this problem, 
while Allen (1992) argues that society has a right to limit 
these external costs by imposing bans. See also Gravelle 
and Zimmerman (1994), who argue that passive smoke 
risk has been overestimated by OSHA. 
8. The importance of accommodating nonsmokers is 
evident in industry trade magazines. See for example, 
Walter (1994) and Fruchtman (1992). 
9. Corsun et al. (1996) found that smokers dined out 
less frequently following New York City’s ban of 1995. 
On average, smokers outspent nonsmokers by $21.58 per 
week. 
10. Restaurant and bar markets are not perfectly 
competitive because products are not homogeneous; 
however, because of ease of entry, proﬁts might go to 
normal in the long run. 
customer bases and marginal costs of accom­
modation. Another testable hypothesis is that 
adverse effects are higher for ﬁrms catering 
to relatively many smokers, as ﬁrms with few 
smokers have already found it proﬁtable to 
voluntarily meet regulations. 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Survey data collected by Roper Starch 
for the National Licensed Beverage Asso­
ciation was used to examine how smoking 
laws inﬂuence ﬁrms. The telephone survey 
was conducted during the period of Septem­
ber 5–12, 1996. The sample consisted of 
owners/managers of 650 restaurants and 650 
bars/taverns across the United States. Sam­
ples were drawn in a statistically random 
manner from national lists provided by Sur­
vey Sampling, Inc., and are applicable to all 
such establishments with a maximum sam­
pling error of approximately ±4 percent­
age points. The survey instrument includes 
questions pertaining to seating allocations, 
attitudes toward smoking laws, strategies to 
deal with smoking/nonsmoking customers, 
revenues, and projections of effects of smok­
ing laws on revenues. The sample is divided 
into states with and without smoking laws, 
using the classiﬁcation system of the Center 
for Disease Control that deﬁnes smoking laws 
as laws allowing or requiring nonsmoking sec­
tions in restaurants.11 
This sample provides many advantages 
over those used in previous studies. This study 
uses ﬁrm-level data, facilitating the analysis of 
distributional impacts. This is a random sam­
ple and does not suffer from selectivity bias 
problems. The random nature of the selec­
tion process also minimizes potential for bias 
relating to imperfect compliance issues. This 
sample does not choose ﬁrms on the basis 
of whether they operate under smoking laws, 
and questions were posed to owners under 
the assumption of full enforcement. But, as 
with previous studies, this data set focuses on 
revenues. An examination of proﬁts would be 
preferable, but we know of no data that con­
nect proﬁts with smoking laws. However, the 
11. Local communities may also impose laws, but 
these are not included here because we do not know 
exact locations of ﬁrms. However, local laws are less 
common in states without smoking laws—thus the state 
measure provides a good measure of restrictions faced 
by businesses. 
TABLE 1 
Expected Revenue Changes 
All Firms Smoking No 
Law Law 
Percentage of Restaurants 
Higher 6% 6% 6% 
Revenues 
Lower 39 38 42 
Revenues 
No Change 51 51 49 
Don’t Know 4 5 3 
Observations 650 444 206 
Percentage of Bars and Taverns 
Higher 2% 2% 1% 
Revenues 
Lower 83 85 75 
Revenues 
No Change 13 11 18 
Don’t Know 2 2 6 
Observations 650 524 126 
focus on revenues allows for the direct com­
parison with results from previous studies. It 
is also important to note that economists tend 
to be suspicious of survey data asking about 
probable effects. We attempt to overcome this 
problem by comparing responses of owners 
who have already been subject to smoking 
restrictions with those who have not, and we 
are inclined to rely more heavily on responses 
by ﬁrms that already have experienced smok­
ing restrictions. 
V. DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
Owners were asked how revenues would 
change following laws requiring that all ﬁrms 
become virtually nonsmoking. Table 1 displays 
expected effects on all restaurants, as well 
as broken down into states with and with­
out smoking laws. From the entire sample, a 
restrictive smoking law is predicted to raise 
revenues by 6% of restaurant owners and 
lower revenues by 39%. Just over 50% of 
owners expected no change, and 4% provided 
no prediction. 
A 2 test indicates that the pattern of 
expected outcomes reported by owners in 
smoking law states does not differ signiﬁ­
cantly (5% level) from those in no-law states. 
Managers with experience of dealing with 
laws then offer identical predictions as those 
without them. This is interesting because ban 
advocates often argue that owners have no 
reason to fear economic impacts. But, assur­
ances of no effect appear somewhat mis­
placed given that 38% of owners that have 
already operated under some form of a law 
predict that virtual bans lower revenues. 
Table 1 also displays expected revenue 
changes by owners of bars. From the entire 
sample, a ban is predicted to raise revenues 
by 2% of owners, lower revenues by 83%, and 
produce no change by 13% (2% provided no 
prediction). Again, using a 2 test, responses 
do not differ signiﬁcantly when broken down 
into states with and without laws, thus indi­
cating that ﬁrms that have already experi­
enced smoking laws offer similar predictions. 
A 2 test also indicates that responses 
signiﬁcantly differ between restaurant and 
bar/tavern owners. Owners of bars and tav­
erns are more than twice as likely to predict 
decreased revenues, indicating that laws are 
expected to impose effects that differ across 
industries. 
VI. ARE OWNER RESPONSES CONSISTENT 
WITH THE ECONOMIC MODEL? 
A potential problem with this analysis 
stems from the survey nature of the data 
and that predictions may not reﬂect actual 
events—a problem characteristic of survey 
analysis of possible future events. This short­
coming is ameliorated to large degree by 
determining how responses vary by current 
seating allocations. That is, do ﬁrms that pre­
dict adverse effects tend to allocate relatively 
few seats to nonsmoking use—or cater to 
relatively many smokers? If so, those ﬁrms 
catering to relatively few smokers and allocat­
ing relatively many seats to nonsmoking use 
should predict revenue gains or no revenue 
effects. Moreover, as discussed above, these 
owners may now attract smokers that pre­
viously were not pleased with their policies, 
and establishments that previously catered to 
smokers may now compete with other ﬁrms 
on the basis of price or quality. 
Only data on restaurants are examined 
because of little variation in seating alloca­
tions of bars and taverns. Table 2 indicates 
that 40 restaurants predicted revenue gains, 
254 predicted revenue losses, and 329 pre­
dicted no changes.12 Relationships between 
12. Twenty seven owners did not know what to pre­
dict and have been excluded from this analysis. 
 
 
predictions and seating allocations are consis­
tent with expectations. Firms predicting losses 
have relatively low seating allocations to non­
smoking use (38%), which strongly indicates 
that they cater to large populations of smok­
ers. Firms predicting gains report relatively 
high seating nonsmoking allocations (70%), 
which suggests they expect to attract smokers 
who previously did not like their nonsmok­
ing policies. Finally, ﬁrms predicting no rev­
enue effects have seating allocations (64%) 
much higher than those predicting losses, and 
slightly below those predicting gains. 
Table 2 also displays seating allocations bro­
ken down into restaurants that operate in states 
with and without smoking laws. Again, under 
both conditions, owners predicting revenue 
gains or no change tended to allocate relatively 
many seats to nonsmoking use, and owners pre­
dicting revenue losses tended to allocate rela­
tively few seats to nonsmoking use. 
In sum, predictions of revenue changes 
are consistent with the economic model of 
seating allocations and support our empirical 
evidence demonstrating that laws exert differ­
ential effects. 
Potential for bias deserves reiteration. 
Owners may oppose smoking laws for per­
sonal reasons and, as a result, exaggerate 
their expected costs.13 One might imagine that 
smokers are interested in serving other smok­
ers, and they may exaggerate costs of laws. 
However, we have no information on the 
likelihood of this event, and know of no data 
set that contains actual proﬁt effects and 
seating allocations. Moreover, while owners 
may have personal views, it remains unclear 
whether views regarding smoking would over­
ride preferences for maximizing the value 
of their ﬁrms. Whether they proﬁt-maximize 
or cater to personal preferences regarding 
smoking remains an issue for future research. 
VII. LOGIT MODEL OF EXPECTED
 
REVENUE CHANGES
 
A qualitative choice model estimates the 
probability that an owner with a given set of 
attributes predicts that bans lower revenues. 
The following logit model is estimated. 
(1) changei = f �NSi chaini agei 
sizei bari lawi� 
13. See Berrens et al. (1997) and Kerkvliet (1994) 
for concerns with survey data. 
where 
NSi = percentage of seating allocated 
to nonsmoking use, 
chaini = 1 if ﬁrm is a member of a 
corporate chain and 0 otherwise, 
agei = years ﬁrm has been in business, 
sizei = number of employees (full-time 
and part-time), 
bari = 1 if bar/tavern and 0 otherwise, 
and 
lawi = 1 if state smoking law is present 
and 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable changei = 0 if owner 
expects either no change or a rise in revenues, 
and 1 if revenues are predicted to fall. 
The percentage of seating that owners 
allocate to nonsmoking use NSi is expected 
to exert a negative inﬂuence on the probabil­
ity that revenues will fall since this variable 
indicates how many nonsmokers are served. 
Whether an establishment is a member of 
a corporate chain is expected to inﬂuence 
responses if chain members offer greater 
accommodation of smokers and nonsmokers 
as an element of overall corporate strategy. 
If true, chain members would be less likely 
to predict revenue falls and the expected sign 
on chaini is negative. 
Years in business, agei, is expected to 
positively affect probabilities of revenue 
drops. Accommodation costs may be posi­
tively related to age of buildings, and older 
ﬁrms may accommodate less, given that they 
tend to cater to more established and sta­
ble customer bases than newer businesses. 
Firm size, sizei, is measured as number of 
employees and is expected to exert a neg­
ative inﬂuence when scale economies exist 
in accommodation. For example, larger ﬁrms 
may ﬁnd it easier or cheaper to separate 
smokers from nonsmokers. A positive sign 
is expected on bari following the discussion 
that bars/taverns ﬁnd it more costly to sep­
arate smokers from nonsmokers and their 
customer bases have less preference for non­
smoking seating. Table 3 displays logit esti­
mations for all ﬁrms, restaurants only, and 
bars/taverns samples. 
Estimation based on all ﬁrms supports 
many of the expectations. Higher shares of 
nonsmoking seating lower the probability that 
TABLE 2 
Percentage of Seating Allocations to Nonsmoking Use by Restaurants 
Prediction Mean Median Std. Dev. Number 
All States 
Revenue gains 70% 95% 38.9 40 
Revenue losses 38% 33% 36.1 254 
No changes 64% 75% 38.7 329 
Smoking Law States 
Revenue gains 72% 100% 39.1 27 
Revenue losses 41% 45% 37.1 167 
No changes 68% 85% 38.3 229 
No-Law States 
Revenue gains 66% 80% 39.7 13 
Revenue losses 31% 25% 33.6 87 
No changes 56% 60% 38.2 100 
TABLE 3 
Logit Model of Revenue Change 
All Firms Restaurants Bars/Taverns 
Constant 0.26 0.33 1.39* 
1.36 1.59 5.35 
NS −0.02* −0.02* −0.01*** 
8.11 7.68 1.66 
Chain −0.29*** −0.33*** −0.25 
1.86 1.72 0.84 
Age 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 
2.20 1.95 0.96 
Size 0.01 0.01*** −.004 
1.58 1.80 0.53 
Bar 1.30* 
7.69 
Law 0.15 0.03 0.43 
0.94 0.17 1.62 
Log Likelihood −648.73 −380.88 −265.52 
Obs with Dep = 0 465 369 96 
Obs with Dep = 1 793 254 539 
Observations 1258 623 635 
Dependent variable = 0 if owner expects no change, or a revenue increase, = 1 if owner expects a revenue decrease. 
Asymptotic t statistics are given below estimated coefﬁcients. 
∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ , , denote signiﬁcant at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. 
owners expect adverse revenue effects, chain 
members are less likely to expect revenue 
reductions, older ﬁrms are more likely to 
expect revenue declines, and bar owners are 
more likely to expect revenues to fall than 
are restaurant owners.14 Firm size and pres­
14. Alternative speciﬁcations checked for model sta­
bility between small and large establishments, young 
and old establishments, and chain versus independent 
ﬁrms. In all cases, the percentage of nonsmoking seating 
remained signiﬁcant and of the same sign. The smoking 
law variable remained insigniﬁcant. The other variables 
retained the same properties. 
ence of state smoking laws do not signiﬁ­
cantly inﬂuence the equation. 
Estimation based on only restaurants 
supports the same signiﬁcant relationships, 
except of course the bari variable has been 
removed from the equation. In addition, ﬁrm 
size is estimated to exert a weak (.10 level) 
positive effect on the probability that an 
owner expects a revenue loss. 
Estimation based on only bars/taverns 
yields just one signiﬁcant factor: the share of 
nonsmoking seating exerts a negative effect, 
 as expected, and is consistent with the other 
estimations. This effect is only weakly signif­
icant at the .10 level, but estimation results 
suggest that most bar/tavern owners expect 
that a virtual smoking ban will lower revenues. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article examines the revenue effects 
that smoking laws exert on restaurants, bars, 
and taverns as predicted by 1,300 owners of 
these ﬁrms. While a subset of ﬁrms is likely 
to suffer adverse revenue effects following a 
smoking ban, bars and taverns are predicted 
to experience adverse effects more than twice 
as often as restaurants. This is consistent 
with “reality checks” that indicated that rev­
enue predictions reﬂect owner perceptions 
of customer preferences regarding smoking. 
Adverse revenue effects were most often pre­
dicted by owners allocating relatively little 
seating to nonsmoking use, and positive or 
neutral effects were most often predicted by 
owners who allocated relatively much of their 
seating to nonsmoking use. 
The interesting public policy issue con­
cerns the distribution of effects, and not the 
average effect exerted on a particular indus­
try. It is true that 51% of restaurant owners 
predicted no revenue changes, but it is inap­
propriate to conclude that no effect would be 
exerted on this industry since 39% of owners 
predicted that revenues would fall following 
a virtual smoking ban. Similarly, not all bars 
and taverns are predicted to experience iden­
tical effects, but the distribution of predicted 
effects is much tighter (83% predict revenues 
to fall) for this industry. 
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